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Abstract
SZAROWSKÁ, I.: Public spending and Wagner’s law in Central and Eastern European countries.  Acta univ. agric. 
et silvic. Mendel. Brun., 2012, LX, No. 2, pp. 383–390
This paper provides direct empirical evidence on cyclicality and the long-term and short-term 
relationship between government spending and output in eight Central and Eastern European 
countries in a period 1995–2009. We analyzed annual data on government spending in compliance 
with the COFOG international standard. Although the theory implies that government spending 
is countercyclical, our research does not prove that. The results conﬁ rm cyclical development of 
government spending on GDP, Wagner’s law and voracity eﬀ ect in the CEE countries during 1995–
2009. 
We used Johansen cointegration test and the error correction model. Output and government 
spending are cointegrated for at least 4 from 10 spending functions in every country and it implies 
a long-term relationship between government spending and output. The government spending 
functions are procyclical in most CEE countries (93% cases in the sample). Average value of long-run 
elasticity coeﬃ  cient is 1.74 for all spending functions, 1.02 for total government spending. We also 
analyzed the short-run relationship between spending and output. The coeﬃ  cient values (average is 
2.89) conﬁ rm the voracity hypothesis, as they suggest that in response to a given shock to real GDP, 
government spending rises by even more in percentage points. 
government spending, cyclicality, voracity eﬀ ect, long-run elasticity, short-run elasticity, cointegration, 
error correction term
The economy of the country is greatly inﬂ uenced 
by the level and the structure of government 
spending. Government spending plays important 
role in a ﬁ scal policy of each country as a possible 
automatic stabilizer as from a Keynesian perspective, 
there is a view that government spending should act 
as a stabilizing force and move in a countercyclical 
direction (procyclical ﬁ scal policy is conversely 
policy expansionary in booms and contractionary 
in recessions). Contrary to the theory (it implies 
that government spending is countercyclical), 
many of empirical studies found evidence that 
government spending is procyclical. See Hercowitz 
and Strawczynski (2004),  Kaminsky et al. (2004), 
Alesina et al. (2008), Rajkumar and Swaroop 
(2008), Hamerníková et al. (2009), Ganeli (2010) or 
Szarowská (2011) for more details. Talvi and Vegh 
(2005) show that ﬁ scal procyclicality is evident in 
a much wider sample of countries. Lane (1998) ﬁ nds 
procyclicality in a single-country time series study 
of Irish ﬁ scal policy. Lane (2003) also shows that the 
level of cyclicality varies across spending categories 
and across OECD countries. Abbot and Jones (2011) 
test diﬀ erences in the cyclicality of government 
spending across functional categories. Their 
evidence from 20 OECD countries suggests that 
procyclicality is more likely in smaller functional 
budgets, but capital spending is more likely to be 
procyclical for the larger spending categories. Many 
of researches as Gavin et al. (1996), Gavin and Perotti 
(1997) focused on Latin America. On the one hand, 
Galí, (1994) shows in his research that spending is 
countercyclical . However, other papers show no 
discernible pattern. Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994) 
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document for G7 countries, the correlation between 
government consumption and output indeed 
appears to show no pattern and be clustered around 
zero.  The diﬀ erences in these results depend on 
the components of spending being measured. 
Government transfers and subsidies are found to 
have become substantially more countercyclical.
In fact, development of government spending 
is o en associated with Wagner ’s law and voracity 
eﬀ ect. Wagner’s law states that government activity 
increases as economies grow, with the pace of 
increase being diﬀ erent for diﬀ erent branches of 
government. Voracity eﬀ ect occurs if a positive 
shock to income leads to a more than proportional 
increase in public spending, even if the shock 
is expected to be temporary. The voracity is 
usually attributed to weak institutions and ethnic 
fractionalization, manifested in the presence of 
multiple interest groups seeking to secure a greater 
share of national wealth by demanding larger public 
spending on their behalf. The existing literature 
testing Wagner’s law varies considerably in terms of 
the dependent and independent variables chosen to 
“test” the law. Wagner (1911) originally proposed that 
as industrialization or social progress proceeded, 
public sectors would grow in relative importance. 
In practice, researchers use diﬀ erent measures 
of national income as a measure of this social 
progress. Peacock and Scott (2000) point out on 
the fact that there are at least 14 diﬀ erent measures 
of government spending that have been used in 
the literature, and at least 13 diﬀ erent measures of 
output, including output per capita. In this paper 
we adopt the simplest formulation of Wagner’s law 
by focusing on the relationship between aggregate 
economic activity and government spending 
in compliance with the COFOG international 
standard.
Most studies analyzing the cyclicality of 
government spending and output have used a panel 
data methodology that has not fully exploited the 
time-series properties of the data. On the other 
hand, studies testing for a long-run relationship, 
such as Wagner’s law, have ignored the short-term 
aspects of this relationship. In the literature on 
cyclicality, many studies use panel data models that 
are not well suited to exploring short-term versus 
long-term relationships. We exploit both the time-
series and cross-sectional aspects using an error-
correction framework. 
The aim of the paper is to provide direct empirical 
evidence on cyclicality and the short-term and long-
term relationship between government spending 
and output in eight Central and Eastern European 
countries. We follow Akitoby et al. (2006) and we 
apply Johansen cointegration test (1991) and the 
error correction model on annul data of GDP and 
government spending the period 1995–2009 from 
Eurostat. The article is organized as follows. In the 
next section, we describe the dataset and empirical 
techniques used. In Section 3, we present the results 
of government spending cyclicality and long-run 
and short-run relationship between output and 
government spending. In Section 4, we conclude 
with a summary of key ﬁ ndings. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The dataset consists of annual data on GDP 
and government spending in compliance with 
the COFOG international standard during the 
period 1995–2009. It is not possible to use higher 
frequently time series data as COFOG classiﬁ cation 
analyzes and reports only annual data. The 
countries included in the analysis are Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Poland and Lithuania had 
to be excluded from the sample due to insuﬃ  cient 
number of observations. All the data are collected 
from the Eurostat database. The series for GDP and 
total government spending and its subcomponent 
are adjusted at constant prices. In line with Akitoby 
et al. (2006), we investigated ﬁ scal and output co-
movements by the approach proposed by Lane 
(2003). We estimated the elasticity of government 
spending with respect to output, based on country-
by-country time-series regressions. Next we used 
an error-correction approach, which allows us to 
distinguish between the short-term eﬀ ect of output 
on government spending and any longer-term eﬀ ect 
between these two variables. Most of the results 
were calculated in econometric program Eviews 7.
Many studies point out that using non-stationary 
macroeconomic variable in time series analysis 
causes superiority problems in regression. Thus, 
a unit root test should precede any empirical study 
employing such variables. We decided to make the 
decision on the existence of a unit root through 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF test). The 
equation (1) is formulated for the stationary testing.
0 1 2 1
1
k
t t i t i t
i
x t x x u    

       . (1)
ADF test is used to determine a unit root xt at all 
variables in the time t. Variable Δxt−i expresses the 
lagged ﬁ rst diﬀ erence and ut estimate autocorrelation 
error. Coeﬃ  cients 0, 1, 2 and i are estimated. Zero 
and the alternative hypothesis for the existence of 
a unit root in the xt variable are speciﬁ ed in (2). 
H0: 2 = 0, H: 2 < 0. (2)
The result of ADF test, which conﬁ rms the 
stationary of all time series on the ﬁ rst diﬀ erence, 
is available on request. Testing the stationary is 
the essential assumption for implementation of 
cointegration approach. It is necessary to conﬁ rm 
that time series are non-stationary at level data but 
stationary at ﬁ rst diﬀ erence.
We suppose there is a steady-state relationship 
between government spending and output given 
by (3).
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G = AY (3)
G represents government spending, Y means output 
and Eq. (3) can also be written in linear form:
log log ,G Y   log .A   (4)
If the adjustment of spending G to its steady-state 
is gradual, then the level of spending will respond 
to transitory changes in output, and G will move 
gradually toward its steady-state, or equilibrium 
level. To capture this gradual move, we specify 
a general autoregressive distributed lag speciﬁ cation 
for spending category i in period t: 
1 0 1 1log log log log ,it it t t tG G Y Y           || < 1, (5) 
We can solve for the static, steady-state 
equilibrium by assuming that output is at its steady-
state level and ignoring the error term:
0 1log log ,
1 1
G Y   
   1   . (6)
More generally, we could allow output to grow 
at rate g. In this case, the only diﬀ erence is that the 
constant term becomes 
0( )
1
g  

 
 , which depends 
on g. To reﬂ ect the steady state, (5) can be rearranged 
as the error correction model (7).
 0 1 1log log log log .it t it t tG Y G Y           (7)
In (7), we can interpret 0ΔlogYt as the short-term 
impact of output on spending and 0 as the short-run 
elasticity of government spending with respect to 
output. The error correction term (logGit−1 − logYt−1) 
captures deviations from the steady-state, or long-
run equilibrium, where  is the long-run elasticity 
of government spending with respect to output, 
and  is the rate at which government spending 
adjusts to past disequilibrium. μ is constants of the 
model, t means residual component of long-term 
relationship.
Moreover, (7) can be rewritten as (8) and then used 
to test if there is a long-run relationship between 
government spending and output. In particular, 
following Ericsson and McKinnon (2002), if  is 
signiﬁ cantly diﬀ erent from zero in (8), then output 
and government spending are cointegrated. 
0 1 1log log log log ,it t it t tG Y G Y           (8)
where  = . The above derivation makes clear the 
underlying assumption that there is a elasticity 
relationship between output and expenditure, while 
the transitory deviations are random. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Government spending can help in overcoming 
the ineﬃ  ciencies of the market system in the 
allocation of economic resources. It also can help 
in smoothing out cyclical ﬂ uctuations in the 
economy and inﬂ uences a level of employment and 
price stability. Thus, government spending plays 
a crucial role in the economic growth of a country. 
We used government spending in compliance with 
the COFOG international standard (Classiﬁ cation 
of the Functions of Government) in our analysis. 
Total government spending is divided into 10 basic 
divisions:
• G10: General public services
• G20: Defense
• G30: Public order and safety
• G40: Economic aﬀ airs
• G50: Environment protection
• G60: Housing and community amenities
• G70: Health
• G80: Recreation; culture and religion
• G90: Education
• G100: Social protection.
The structure of government spending 
Firstly we analyzed the structure of government 
spending in a period 1995–2009. Results in 
Tab. I show the average share of government 
spending by functions, the average on total 
spending and the share of total government 
spending on GDP in each country during the 
analyzed period. Tab. I also presents the average of 
variables in all countries. Data conﬁ rm signiﬁ cant 
I: Development of government spending function (in % of total G)
G10 G20 G30 G40 G50 G60 G70 G80 G90 G100 G as% GDP
CZ 10.2% 3.4% 5.1% 19.3% 2.3% 2.7% 14.7% 2.7% 10.2% 29.4% 44.7%
HU 21.1% 2.4% 4.0% 12.3% 1.4% 2.0% 10.5% 3.1% 10.8% 32.5% 49.9%
SK 14.4% 4.6% 5.9% 15.3% 1.9% 2.2% 13.4% 2.4% 8.9% 30.9% 43.3%
BG 17.5% 6.0% 6.8% 11.5% 2.6% 1.8% 10.9% 2.0% 10.4% 30.7% 39.2%
EE 9.5% 3.9% 6.8% 11.3% 2.1% 1.3% 12.0% 5.8% 18.2% 29.2% 37.2%
LV 10.9% 3.0% 6.6% 13.7% 1.3% 3.3% 10.4% 3.6% 15.7% 31.5% 37.8%
RO 14.6% 5.8% 4.9% 17.0% 0.7% 4.4% 9.3% 2.4% 10.3% 30.6% 36.1%
SI 12.6% 2.9% 3.8% 10.0% 1.7% 1.4% 14.0% 3.0% 13.9% 36.7% 45.8%
Average 13.8% 4.0% 5.5% 13.8% 1.8% 2.4% 11.9% 3.1% 12.3% 31.4% 41.8%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Eurostat
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diﬀ erences between countries and spending 
functions as well. Five spending functions, on 
average, account for more than 83% of the total 
spending: Social protection, Economic aﬀ airs, 
Health, General public services and Education. The 
Social protection spending (G100) is the highest 
spending function in every country and it takes 
nearly the third of all government spending. It 
contains, for example, spending on sickness and 
disability, old age, survivors, family and children, 
unemployment, housing, social exclusion and R&D 
social protection. 
The total average spending of General public 
services (G10) and Economics aﬀ airs (G40) is the 
same (13.8%), but the share diﬀ ers in each country. 
The highest value of G10 is in Hungary, it is due to 
a higher spending on public debt services then in 
other countries. Estonia has the highest Education 
spending (G90), it’s share is more than the twice 
value of Slovakia. The value of total government 
spending is the smallest in Romania (36.1% GDP), the 
highest in Hungary (49.9% GDP), and the average of 
all countries is 41.8% GDP, that expresses signiﬁ cant 
diﬀ erences in size and importance of public sector 
in the sample of countries.
The cyclicality of government spending
As was already noted, government spending 
is a possible automatic stabilizer. The cyclicality 
of government spending is typically deﬁ ned in 
terms of how spending moves with the output 
gap. If government spending increases when 
there is a positive output gap (i.e. output is below 
its potential), then spending is countercyclical. If 
potential output were observable or easy to estimate, 
one could deﬁ ne counter-cyclicality as an above-
average spending to output ratio whenever output 
was below its potential. As Akitoby et al. (2006) 
mention, measuring potential output is diﬃ  cult. 
As a consequence, it is not easy to discuss business 
cycles or cyclicality per se. Therefore we focus on 
co-movements of government spending and output 
as a proxy for cyclicality.
Tab. II reports the estimates of the adjustment 
coeﬃ  cient  from equation (7), which is estimated 
by OLS with a correction for an autoregressive error 
term.  is the rate at which government spending 
adjusts to past disequilibrium. In cases where  is 
signiﬁ cant, we can conclude there is a cointegrating 
relationship between government spending and 
output. The results indicate signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence 
across spending functions. For most countries 
(62.5%), there is a long-term relationship between 
total government spending and output consistent 
with Wagner›s law. Although the error correction 
term not signiﬁ cant for all spending functions 
in any country of the sample, all countries have 
a signiﬁ cant error correction term for at least four 
of the spending functions. For example, adjustment 
coeﬃ  cient is signiﬁ cant for 8 from 10 spending 
functions in Romania and Slovenia. Moreover, the 
error correction term for Housing and community 
II: The adjustment coeﬃ  cient 
G total G10 G20 G30 G40 G50 G60 G70 G80 G90 G100
CR
0.03 −0.14 −0.37 −1.14* −0.41 −0.45* −0.85* −0.35 −0.80* −0.22 −0.19
(0.03) (0.32) (0.62) (0.36) (0.25) (0.16) (0.49) (0.33) (0.27) (0.27) (0.21)
HU
−0.63 −0.15 0.27 0.45 −1.70* −1.21** −0.16* −0.12 −0.33 0.30* −0.36
(0.45) (0.09) (0.70) (0.28) (0.46) (0.26) (0.08) (0.36) (0.195) (0.32) (0.25)
SK
−0.90* −2.04** −1.21* −0.29 −0.03 −1.29* −1.67** −1.09** −1.05* 0.03 −1.33**
(0.40) (0.44) (0.57) (0.53) (0.37) (0.45) (0.24) (0.42) (0.31) (0.17) (0.27)
BG
−2.72** −1.00 0.04 0.31 −2.00* −1.15* −1.20* −0.06 −2.22* −0.52 −0.52*
(0.48) (0.56) (0.04) (0.36) (0.76) (0.58) (0.37) (0.34) (0.64) (0.42) (0.27)
EE
−0.45 −1.51* −0.57 −1.52* −0.20 −1.25* −1.25* −0.38 −0.84* −1.91* −0.81*
(0.33) (0.47) (0.35) (0.49) (0.23) (0.46) (0.54) (0.21) (0.40) (0.49) (0.29)
LV
−1.00** −0.09 −0.12 −0.64* −0.91* −0.14 0.12* −0.85* −0.76* −1.51* −0.68*
(0.23) (0.08) (0.55) (0.20) (0.29) (0.23) (0.05) (0.27) (0.29) (0.39) (0.26)
RO
−0.16 −0.56* −0.85** −1.27* −1.27* −1.38** −0.46* −0.12 −1.73** −1.35 −0.05*
(0.20) (0.20 (0.17) (0.61) (0.35) (0.15) (0.23) (0.13) (0.27) (0.84) (0.02)
SI
−1.12* −1.75** 0.09* −0.69* −1.53* −0.64** 0.97* −0.97** 1.55* −0.24 0.02
(0.30) (0.15) (0.02) (0.22) (0.50) (0.15) (0.50) (0.19) (0.68) (0.38) (0.05)
Average 1.15 1.47 0.71 0.93 1.48 1.5 0.84 0.97 1.28 1.24 0.68
Share 
signiﬁ cant
62.5% 50.0% 37.5% 75.0% 62.5% 87.5% 100.0% 37.5% 87.5% 37.5% 62.5%
Symbols * and ** denote signiﬁ cance at the 1% and 5% level, standard deviation are in parenthesis. 
Average means the average absolute values of signiﬁ cant coeﬃ  cients only
Share signiﬁ cant means share of signiﬁ cant cases
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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amenities (G60) is signiﬁ cant in all countries. 
As expected, the adjustment coeﬃ  cients are 
mostly negative, indicating dynamic stability. The 
implication of a signiﬁ cant error correction term is 
that there is in fact a long-term relationship between 
government spending and output. But it is suitable 
to point out that the existence of cointegration 
does not imply causality, which is consistent 
with Wagner›s view that there is not necessarily 
a cause and eﬀ ect relationship between economic 
development and government activity.
Tab. III summarizes the results about the long- 
run elasticity of spending with respect to output. It 
contains only signiﬁ cant coeﬃ  cients, the long-run 
elasticity coeﬃ  cient  is signiﬁ cant in 84% cases. 
A positive value of  is consistent with a wider 
interpretation of Wagner›s law, as it implies that 
government spending rises with national income. 
If  is higher than one then this would be consistent 
with a narrow interpretation of Wagner›s law, where 
government expenditure rises faster than national 
income.
The long-term elasticity of government spending 
and output  is positive (in 93% cases), and it is the 
highest for Defense spending (G20) due to the 
extremely high  coeﬃ  cient in Bulgaria (it greatly 
increased the average). Moreover,  is for total 
spending larger than one (1.02), average value is 
1.74 for all spending functions. It is consistent with 
the narrow interpretation of Wagner›s law and 
indicating that in the long-term, the public sector 
is increasing in relative importance. The coeﬃ  cient 
for long-run elasticity was signiﬁ cant in all cases 
(countries) for total spending, Economic aﬀ airs 
(G40), Health (G70), Recreation; culture and religion 
(G80) and Social protection (G100). This is important 
as these spending functions include more than 60% 
of total government spending. The average long-run 
elasticity coeﬃ  cient  is lower than one (0.83) only in 
the case of General public services (G10), it means 
that G10 rises slower than national income. This 
development is inﬂ uenced especially by decreasing 
spending on basic research, R&D related to general 
public services, public debt services and transfers 
of a general character between diﬀ erent levels of 
government.
We also analyzed the short-term elasticity 
between government spending and output. 
Signiﬁ cant results are in Tab. IV.
The results for the short-run elasticity of 
government spending to output are not so 
unequivocal. For all spending categories, the 
average coeﬃ  cient is 2.89. Although the short-run 
elasticity of spending functions is positive for 70% of 
the countries in the sample, it’s needed to points out 
only 29% statistical signiﬁ cant of results. However, 
the coeﬃ  cient value above one is consistent with the 
voracity hypothesis, as it suggests that in response 
to a given shock to real GDP, government spending 
rises by even more in percentage points. 
III: The long-run elasticity coeﬃ  cient 
G total G10 G20 G30 G40 G50 G60 G70 G80 G90 G100
CR
1.62** 1.54** 0.50** −0.46* 2.01* 1.94** 1.80** 1.62** 1.36**
(0.10) (0.26) (0.07) (0.16) (0.53) (0.15) (0.21) (0.24) (0.19)
HU
1.06** 1.33* 1.79** 1.92** 0.91** 1.05** 3.06* 1.31** 1.85** 1.65** 1.60**
(0.05) (0.42) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.22) (1.19) (0.11) (0.21) (0.10) (0.18)
SK
0.46** 0.32* −0.21* −1.27* 0.09* 1.20** 0.52* 0.54**
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.39) (0.12) (0.07) (0.23) (0.06)
BG
0.86** 7.27** 2.07** 1.49** 4.37** 2.95** 0.99** 1.33** 0.61**
(0.02) (1.19) (0.31) (0.14) (0.29) (0.62) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
EE
0.79** 0.41** 1.34** 0.59** 0.65* 1.34** −1.14* 0.80** 1.01** 0.72** 0.91**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.22) (0.07) (0.46) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05)
LV
0.82** 1.95** 0.48* 1.11** 3.48** 4.74** 0.96** 1.12** 0.97** 0.37**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.07) (0.27) (1.03) (0.13) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
RO
1.84** −1.49* 1.23** 2.14** 1.88* 3.02* 2.84** 1.45** 11.99**
(0.31) (0.70) (0.28) (0.26) (0.49) (1.28) (0.24) (0.12) (2.36)
SI
0.69** 0.53** 9.07** 0.70** 0.64** 0.63** 1.05** 1.10**
(0.02) (0.04) (1.68 (0.08) (0.04) (0.13) (0.08) (0.03)
Average 1.02 0.83 3.30 1.13 1.09 1.94 2.57 1.60 1.34 1.26 2.31
Share 
signiﬁ cant
100.0% 62.5% 87.5% 75.0% 100.0% 50.0% 75.0% 100.0% 100.0% 87.5% 100.0%
Symbols * and ** denote signiﬁ cance at the 1% and 5% level, standard deviation are in parenthesis. 
Average means the average absolute values of signiﬁ cant coeﬃ  cients only
Share signiﬁ cant means share of signiﬁ cant cases
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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IV: The short-run elasticity coeﬃ  cient 
G total G10 G20 G30 G40 G50 G60 G70 G80 G90 G100
CR
1.41* 2.34* 5.45** 0.81*
(0.66) (1.28) (2.16) (3.57)
HU
0.31* 0.09* 0.48*
(1.03) (2.68) (2.35)
SK
7.33** 2.58* 1.65*
 (1.18) (1.38) (0.56)
BG
−2.39*
(−0.75)
EE
0.96* 1.06*
(−0.32) (−0.41)
LV
2.80*
(−1.22)
RO
−2.39* 7.65** −1.923* 12.68** −1.51* −7.63**
(−1.12) (−1.56) (−1.05) (−1.53) (−0.81) (−1.60)
SI
−0.90* −5.72* 7.22* 1.89*
(−0.45) (−1.94) (−3.37) (−0.81)
Average 2.39 2.73 5.39 1.41 2.13 6.07 0.64 1.69 5.31 1.89 1.65
Share 
signiﬁ cant
12.5% 50.0% 37.5% 12.5% 25.0% 37.5% 25.0% 37.5% 37.5% 12.5% 12.5%
Symbols * and ** denote signiﬁ cance at the 1% and 5% level, standard deviation are in parenthesis. 
Average means the average absolute values of signiﬁ cant coeﬃ  cients only
Share signiﬁ cant means share of signiﬁ cant cases
Source: Authors’ calculations 
CONCLUSION
The aim of this article was to fulﬁ ll the gap in literature and provide direct empirical evidence on 
cyclicality and the long-term and short-term relationship between government spending and output 
in eight Central and Eastern European countries in a period 1995–2009. We analyzed annual data on 
government spending in compliance with the COFOG international standard. Although the theory 
implies that government spending is countercyclical, our research does not prove that. The results 
conﬁ rm cyclical development of government spending on GDP, Wagner’s law and voracity eﬀ ect in 
the CEE countries during 1995–2009. 
We used Johansen cointegration test and the error correction model. Output and government 
spending are cointegrated for at least four of the spending functions in every country and it implies 
a long-term relationship between government spending and output. The government spending 
functions are procyclical in most CEE countries (93% cases in the sample). Average value of long-
run elasticity coeﬃ  cient is 1.74 for all spending functions, 1.02 for total government spending. It is 
consistent with the interpretation of Wagner’s law and indicates that the public sector is increasing in 
relative importance in the long-term. The coeﬃ  cient for long-run elasticity was signiﬁ cant for total 
spending, Economic aﬀ airs (G40), Health (G70), Recreation, culture and religion (G80) and Social 
protection (G100) in all cases (countries). This is important as these spending functions include more 
than 60% of total government spending. 
We also analyzed the short-run relationship between spending and output. The coeﬃ  cient values 
(average is 2.89) conﬁ rm the voracity hypothesis, as they suggest that in response to a given shock to 
real GDP, government spending will rise by even more in percentage points. 
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